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OT passage. A similar but more advanced tool is the module “Comprehensive 
Bible Cross References.” However, these two options are based on compilations 
somebody has made of possible references, while the INFER search is a tool 
that enables you to do the primary research yourself, independently.
One area where I see potential for improvement is in aesthetics. It might 
be an issue of personal taste, but in my opinion, the interface for the Windows 
version is a little too technical and crowded in its appearance. The Mac version 
here seems somewhat more tidy and aesthetically pleasing. I would also have 
liked the possibility of removing some functions in the workspace that I do 
not use on a regular basis. For example, it’s possible to remove the toolbar 
with Ctrl+Alt+0, but are a number of other buttons I would have preferred 
to remove if I could. Further, OakTree has designed its own fonts. Even 
though I have used the interface on a daily basis for the last several months, 
I still find myself enlarging the font more than I would normally need to 
when using other Bible software, especially for the Hebrew characters. To be 
comfortable reading it, I’m up to size 27 font! In my opinion, the Hebrew font 
in Accordance simply does not look nice in smaller sizes.
 Overall, Accordance® 10 for Windows provides superior speed in 
searches; has an intuitive syntax search; offers unique tools, like INFER and 
SEARCH BACK; and offers add-on modules that provide sources for one’s 
specific area of interest. Though there are the few aforementioned, minor 
issues, Accordance can be used by the specialist, pastor, and layperson to 
greatly enhance the study of the Bible.
Berrien Springs, Michigan  Kenneth Bergland
Osborn, Ronald E. Death Before the Fall: Biblical Literalism and the Problem 
of Animal Suffering. Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press, 2014. 195pp. 
Paperback, $25.00.
Ronald Osborn’s recent book, Death Before the Fall, consists of a larger part 
1, “On Literalism,” and a shorter part 2, “On Animal Suffering.” This book 
has been described as “intelligently argued yet pastorally sensitive” (Celia 
Deane-Drummond), and “sophisticated” (John F. Haught) (1). The book is 
also recommended by John Walton in a brief foreword (7–8). Osborn aims 
to make the problem of animal suffering less troublesome by arguing against 
“biblical literalism” in order to allow for animal suffering and death before 
the fall of humanity into sin. In other words, his book is an articulation of his 
proposal that death before the fall is a partial solution for two real problems—
animal suffering and biblical literalism. 
Part 1 includes nine chapters that contrast what Osborn regards as a 
legitimate literal interpretation of the Bible (ch. 1) against an illegitimate 
wooden literalism in the interpretation of the Bible (ch. 2). He also critiques 
the illegitimate literalism that is sometimes present in the interpretation 
of the results of the scientific study of nature (ch. 3). For him, a legitimate 
literal interpretation can support the views of “theistic evolution” or “process 
creation” (37). In contrast, an illegitimate literalism is present in biblicism, 
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fundamentalism, creationism (39), and secular scientism (49–58). Osborn 
acknowledges that creationism can function as a “scientific” paradigm 
claiming to be supported by scientific data; but he argues that creationism 
appears to be a degenerating science rather than a progressive science (chapter 
4). He also argues that creationism is a degenerating theological paradigm 
that presupposes an inadequate view of God (ch. 5) and an inadequate 
fundamentalist view of biblical interpretation (ch. 6). In addition, Osborn 
views creationism and scientism as two kinds of gnosticism (ch. 7) (95). After 
his multi-chapter description of the illegitimate literalism of some forms of 
creationism, Osborn proceeds to a discussion of what he regards as a more 
legitimate literal reading of Genesis proposed by Barth, Calvin, Augustine, 
and Maimonides (ch. 8). According to Osborn, this kind of literal reading 
can provide a way beyond the ineffective philosophical and methodological 
foundationalism of creationism and scientism toward a more effective post-
foundationalism in our study of Scripture and nature (ch. 9).
Part 2 of Osborn’s book includes five chapters that address what he 
regards as the greatest theological problem relevant to the issue of a legitimate 
or illegitimate literal reading of Genesis (74). He proposes that there are 
three literalist dilemmas in the creationist approach to the problem of animal 
suffering (ch. 10). First, the stasis dilemma of “a deathless—and so ultimately 
birthless—creation” (129; cf. 128–31). Second, the deceiver God dilemma 
that refuses to accept what the facts of nature are demonstrating about the way 
God creates (131–34). Third, the divine curse dilemma that seeks to explain 
animal suffering as the result of God’s curse when only the serpent is explicitly 
described in Genesis as cursed by God (35, 134–39). Osborn regards C. S. 
Lewis’s “highly speculative” (140) cosmic conflict theodicy as more effective 
than creationism (ch. 11) because Lewis indicates that the fall of the angels 
took place before the creation of humanity causing predation and death before 
the existence and fall of humanity (143). However, Osborn rejects Lewis’s 
approach because it gives the fallen angels too much power over creation and 
it ignores the fact that animal ferocity is described as part of God’s creative 
process as described in the book of Job (ch. 12). Accepting animal suffering as 
part of God’s way of creating is regarded by Osborn as harmonious with the 
central Christian doctrine of Christ’s kenosis (self-emptying) so that he can 
experience suffering and death (ch. 13). Finally, animal suffering is viewed 
as being in harmony with the meaning of the Sabbath as a call for ecological 
concern for the wellbeing of the creation (ch. 14). 
I have been greatly benefited by reading Osborn’s book. Like all good 
books, this one not only informs me but stimulates questions that challenge 
me to do further study. My questions can be categorized under six points: 
animal suffering, biblical literalism, creationism, scientism, Seventh-day 
Adventism, and future dialog.
First, to what extent is animal suffering really a problem if the “central 
riddle” of Osborn’s book is that the “deeply mysterious, untamed, dangerous” 
world is “beautiful and good” (13). Does the goodness of animal suffering not 
explain why “a just and loving God” would “require or permit such a world 
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to exist?” (14). Why then is there “a deep scandal in death and suffering in 
nature” (157)? In addition, if the problem of animal suffering is illuminated 
by God’s incarnation of the suffering creation in the crucified Christ, how is 
the problem illuminated by the resurrection and exaltation of Christ? Osborn 
proposes that “God creates as he redeems and redeems as he creates” (160); 
and that “when Christ cries ‘It is finished’ on Easter Friday the creation of 
the world is at last completed” (165). These statements point to the need for 
further reflection on how animal suffering is illuminated by salvation through 
the incarnate Christ. Does God have a plan for removing animal suffering? 
If so, what might this mean for our reflections on the origin and function 
of animal suffering in a creation that is beautiful and good? (See reviews of 
Osborn’s book by J. Richard Middleton, Them 39:3 (2014): 525–27 and 
Daryll Ward, Feb 4, 2014, spectrummagazine.org). 
Second, how helpful is it to use the terminology of “literal” reading to 
describe the wrong way to read the Bible when Osborn regards his own views 
as supported by a “literal” reading (25–38)? Does he not, in essence, claim 
for himself what creationists also claim—to be “always and only declaring 
what the text self-evidently means” (79)? Osborn defends his critique of 
literalism by an appeal to what people usually mean by this term; and he 
points out the limitations of its conventional definition; but some readers 
might conclude (contrary to what Osborn actually states) that every literal 
reading of the Bible is irresponsible. Osborn has sought to avoid facilitating 
this misunderstanding; and I agree with him that “the greatest problem with 
strict literalism’s ‘plain’ reading approach to Genesis, however, is that it is not 
nearly plain or literal enough. [Some] Creationists have treated Genesis as a 
story that is all surface with no depth” (52). At the same time, questions can 
be raised about whether Osborn is engaging in a legitimate literal reading of 
the Bible when he proposes that “adjectives such as evil and cursed, . . . just do 
not ring true” with regard to the world (13). Could it be that “‘simple faith’ 
in God’s word” (16) can be compatible with responsible reading of the Bible 
that avoids being “highly literalistic” (17)? The importance of this issue is 
highlighted by Martin Luther’s statement that the literal sense is “the highest, 
best, strongest, in short the whole substance nature and foundation of the 
Holy Scripture” (Luther’s Works, ed. J. Pelikan and H. Lehman, [Saint Louis: 
Concordia, 1970], 39:137–224). 
Third, do all creationists view the Bible as “an inerrant Answer Book” 
for scientific questions (85)? Do they all describe creation as being in stasis 
and deceptive, involving absolute dichotomy between animals and humanity? 
Are there not many creationists who, along with Osborn, regard creation as 
revelation from God, and recognize the kinship of animals and humanity 
through a shared Creator? In fact, many creationists agree with Osborn 
that “the Bible is not a scientific textbook” (Leonard Brand, “The Bible and 
Science,” [Silver Spring, MD: Institute for Christian Teaching, 2000]) and 
affirm that nature involves process (not stasis)—including some evolutionary 
processes. These creationists agree that “we have a great deal of evidence for 
evolutionary processes at work in nature, although the causal mechanisms 
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for this evolution and their reach are far less clear” (148). Like Osborn, they 
deny that the Bible “must now be validated or ‘proved’ through—irony of 
ironies—the tools of a thoroughly rationalistic, quantifying and materialistic 
science” (52). Significantly, again like Osborn, they seek harmony between 
their interpretations of the Bible and their interpretations of nature (39–40). 
Osborn’s book should not be used by the careless (contrary to his intentions, 
I presume) to create a “straw man” caricature of creationists or scientists 
(see Middleton).
Fourth, is science generally destructive of faith? Do all scientists defend 
a literalistic scientism? Osborn answers: No. At the same time, he realizes 
that many influential scientists do manifest a scientism that attacks faith. 
“Christians of all denominational backgrounds are wrestling with the great 
attrition rate of their young adults as they head off to colleges and universities 
where they will be exposed to a bewildering array of ideas that are often openly 
hostile to religious faith” (18). Osborn also states that “any nonliteralistic 
approach to Genesis and questions of origins must, however, respond to the 
obvious moral hazards posed by evolutionary theory” (19). His “critique of 
literalism” is a “prolegomena” to his response to “the theodicy dilemma of 
animal suffering and mortality in both literalistic [religious] and evolutionary 
[scientific] paradigms” (19) which are part of the complication of “a significant 
theological riddle” (20). He also appropriately warns against creationist and 
scientific “foundationalisms” (177) which are both religious in an unhealthy 
way. What is needed is an accurate theological and scientific interpretation 
of the problem of animal suffering. (See Rahel Schafer, “‘You, YHWH, Save 
Humans and Animals’: God’s Response to the Vocalized Needs of Non-
Human Animals as Portrayed in the Old Testament,” [PhD diss., Wheaton 
College, 2015]). 
Fifth, is Adventism more prone to an illegitimate and legalistic literalism 
than other religious movements? While Osborn critiques the “biblical 
literalism” and “creationism” common in many Christian communities, he 
also describes his book as “an open letter” to his Seventh-day Adventist (SDA) 
faith community that he views as “troubled” and “in a state of increasing 
turmoil” resulting from “turning strict biblicism or literalism on Genesis into a 
dogmatic litmus test of ‘true’ Adventist identity” (18). He is rightly concerned 
about those who are being driven away from the Bible and religious belief 
because legalistic literalists seem to be “without any room for honest questions, 
openness to the weight of empirical evidence or new interpretations of the 
biblical narratives” (19). He is also concerned about “honest questions about 
faith and science being silenced and committed Christians being branded 
deviationists or ‘infidels’ for not holding fast to ‘scientific’ creationism as the 
seal of what it means to be part of God’s true ‘remnant’” (95). According to 
Osborn, this results in a “senseless loss of engaged minds,” which “are not the 
casualties of evolutionary science” but “a result of problematic philosophical 
reasoning, the exclusionary logic of fundamentalism and the incoherencies of 
wooden literalism itself ” (19). 
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At the same time, though critical of aspects of their work, Osborn 
acknowledges that:
Not a few creationists, though, do have serious credentials as research 
scientists. We must listen very carefully to what these individuals have to say 
about the empirical data they have expert knowledge of. We must also—and 
even more importantly—listen to what they have to say about the kinds of 
theological beliefs that animate their scientific endeavors. . . . For example, . 
. . the Geo-Science Research Institute ([SDA,] creationist ‘think-tank’ in 
Loma Linda, California, that employs eight highly qualified research 
scientists) (69).
The fact that informed Adventist creationists are well able to face hard 
questions honestly is evident in the words of an Adventist scientist quoted by 
Osborn as follows.
In the refreshingly candid words of creationist and nuclear physicist Ben 
Clausen, “No comprehensive, short age model is even available to rival the 
long age model . . . . I do not find the [current scientific] evidence for a 
recent creation compelling. My primary reason for accepting the scriptural 
account is the part it plays in the Bible’s characterization of the Creator” (66). 
Sixth, what is the way forward for informed dialog on death, the fall 
of humanity, biblical literalism, and animal suffering? Osborn complains 
about “deeply unhealthy” “toxic speech habits, blatant power maneuvers,” 
“misrepresentation and incrimination”; and about
how quickly some are prepared to write off people of sincere faith who are 
at different places in their intellectual and spiritual journeys, by how little 
pastoral sensitivity they show in introducing unsettling ideas to others, and 
by how often their sense of scientific certainty and mastery of technical 
knowledge assumes the character of its own ersatz religion (177).
In response, Osborn appeals that “greater civility is required of us all” 
(178). He humbly acknowledges:
I have tried my best in this book to vigorously challenge what I take to 
be damaging and myopic ideas about Scripture without maligning the 
characters of individual people who hold them. Still, I recognize that I 
have much to learn and unlearn in dialog with other Christians, including 
literalists, creationists, and fundamentalists if they desire to be in an 
authentic dialog with believers who have come to different conclusions than 
they have about the meaning of Genesis (178).
In spite of his efforts, there are others who question how successful 
Osborn is in his attempt at tactful communication. Craig M. Story comments 
that “Osborn discusses problems with a literalist interpretation of Genesis 
using rather forceful prose. In fact, the tone at times is too harsh, and will 
likely turn off the very readers he needs to reach with his argument (e.g. some 
creationists are described as ‘self-taught science dilettantes’)” (May 19, 2014, 
biologos.org). Similarly, Clifford Goldstein refers to Osborn’s book as 
containing “venting sessions rather than serious debate” (May 15, 2015, 
spectrummagazine.org). Clearly Osborn’s reviewers use strong language to 
express strong convictions, just as Osborn does.
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It is evident to me that Osborn has opened a dialog that is important 
and fascinating. Those who have an interest in hermeneutics (principles of 
interpretation) in relation to science and theology should read this book. 
Whether or not you agree with specific details of Osborn’s proposal, you will 
be informed and challenged by the very relevant issues he has presented.
Andrews University  Martin Hanna
Peckham, John C. The Love of God: A Canonical Model. Downers Grove: 
InterVarsity Press, 2015. 297 pp. Paperback, $32.00.
In The Love of God: A Canonical Model, John C. Peckham compares two 
sharply opposed concepts of divine love and offers a constructive alternative 
to both. Central to what he labels the “transcendent-voluntarist model” is 
the notion of a radical distinction between God and world. God is entirely 
self-sufficient, and God’s love for the world is purely voluntary. God does not 
need this world or any creaturely world. Moreover, God’s relation to the world 
contributes nothing to God’s experience. Nothing in God is conditioned by 
anything outside of God. In contrast, the “immanent-experientialist model” 
envisions God as both intimately and essentially related to the world. For 
“process panentheists,” like Charles Hartshorne, God’s very existence requires 
the existence of beings other than God, and God’s experience includes God’s 
relations to all non-divine reality. 
According to Peckham, these views of divine love present us with 
an impasse. While they offer sharply different views of God, neither does 
justice to the biblical portrayal of God. As an alternative to both, Peckham 
offers a perspective on divine love derived directly from the “canonical data.” 
According to “the foreconditional-reciprocal model,” as he calls it, God’s love 
for the world is “voluntary,” but not “exclusively volitional” (90). That is to say, 
while the world exists solely as the result of God’s decision to create, God is not 
responsible for everything that happens in the world, and God is genuinely 
affected by it. To spell this out, Peckham describes God’s love as having five 
important aspects—volitional, evaluative, emotional, “foreconditional” (his 
novel expression), and reciprocal—and he devotes a chapter to each of them.
 God’s love for the world is volitional in the sense that creating a world 
was a choice God made rather than something God was required to do by 
nature. It is not exclusively volitional, however, because within God’s general 
commitment to the world and care for it, God occasionally chooses to act 
in specific ways. Divine election, for example, expresses specific decisions 
involving particular people. And while it rests on God’s loving choice, it also 
requires a human response. Love between God and the creatures presupposes 
freedom on both sides.
Other aspects of God’s love clarify and amplify its volitional character. 
God’s love is evaluative in the sense that God not only bestows value on the 
creatures, God receives value from them. “The joy of others is integral to 
God’s own joy” (145). It also indicates that God’s response to human behavior 
